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Abstract: Drawing on recent debates on secularism, this article addresses the
methodological problem of writing histories of secularism in context. It
considers the experience of India. I argue that a study of the issues from which
secularism emerged historically offers a way out of the secularism-religion
binary which, in India, has obscured contemporary problems related to
democracy. These issues had to do with ensuring the public representation of
minorities, both religious and caste, regardless of their relative size or social
power. Scholarship on the minority question has begun with the constituent
assembly and that on secularism centered on the category of religion. In contrast,
this article argues that caste was central to the formulation of Indian secularism
and requires a longer historical perspective. It maintains that secularism reified
the religious minority and, in so doing, denied both its potential to overcome
marginality and the legitimacy of the community in the nation.
INTRODUCTION
The so-called “resurgence of religion” in “a secular age” has prompted
much consideration of the viability of secularism as a set of political pre-
scriptions and philosophical ideals for the contemporary world.1 The
set of precepts that called for a separation of the state from religious insti-
tutions or “politics” from “religion” that developed in Western Europe and
the United States from the 17th century seem anachronistic in the
21st century. The widespread nature of religious movements across the
globe — Christian, Hindu, and Muslim — asserting political ideals and
ambitions from India to Morocco to the United States, have challenged
what many took to be the necessary historical trajectory of liberalism.
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Secularization as part of a world historical and social process of modern-
ization has not resulted in religion’s decline, nor has it “retreated” from the
public sphere to take its proper place in the private lives of individuals.
Scholars have long taken for granted that their work is produced and
consumed in secular spaces within a rational world: we build arguments
on rational investigation and as a result, many of us have found it difficult
to account for the affective, “non-rational” motivations of human behav-
ior. Likewise, the organizing framework of international politics has pro-
ceeded with the assumption that states are rational actors. It had become
common sense that intellectual work and political action grounded in
non-secular epistemologies were somehow suspect: the former, seen to
be forwarding a particular agenda, was believed incapable of arriving at
universal or generalizable conclusions and the latter, in its “unreason,”
proved an inherently destabilizing and socially divisive force in domestic
as well as international arenas. Global religious movements and the asser-
tion of religious identities in liberal democratic societies have implicitly
and explicitly brought the assuredness of secular knowledge and secular
politics into question and have led scholars to ask if we have now entered
a “post-secular” age (Audard, 2011; Habermas, 2008; Pecora, 2006).
In light of secularism’s “failure” to domesticate religion, Charles Taylor
and Juergen Habermas, among others, have returned to the question of how
to resolve the place of religion in the public sphere as part of the “political”
in liberal democracies. Philosophers and historians have argued that the nor-
mative model of secularism requires redefinition and the categories of “reli-
gion” and “politics” unpacking. Secularism, locked in permanent opposition
with religion, has been universalized and simultaneously depleted of
analytical force. As Talal Asad has shown, religion, politics, and secularism
are categories whose meanings are not universal but, rather, are tied to their
historical contexts: they are modern categories, yet their staging was not
replicated in the same way everywhere (Asad 2003; Jakobsen and
Pellegrini, 2008; Mitchell, 2000). It is the elucidation of these contexts
and meanings that can better answer why secularism emerged at particular
junctures in different societies and disaggregate the binary in which politics
and religion have been held. This article extends the conclusions of my
earlier work on the historical experience of India as it reflects on some of
these recent interventions on secularism (Tejani, 2008).
The late 1980s saw the rapid rise of Hindu nationalism (Hindutva) in
India. The success of the Bharatiya Janata Party, the electoral wing of
the Hindu right, in the 1989 general elections and the demolition in
1992 by thousands of Hindutva volunteers of the Babri Masjid, a
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mosque built in 1528 in Ayodhya, said to be the birthplace of the Hindu
god Ram, shocked the world. Postcolonial India had long been held up as
a political success story: the world’s largest democracy, whose citizens
enjoyed freedom of speech and religious tolerance, it was seen to have
escaped the military dictatorships and sectarian conflicts that had been
the fate of so many former colonies. The violence of 1992 appeared to
many in the Western media as the resurgence of internecine rivalries, evi-
dence that Indians had fallen short in the task of over-writing their “tra-
ditional” identities of religion and sect with the “modern” identities of
nation, class and occupation. Liberal intellectuals and the English-
language media debated the “crisis” of secularism in India (Basu et al.
1993; Gopal 1993; Tambiah 1998). How to explain the rise of such reli-
gious sentiment in a secular state? The debate turned on the binaries of
“secularism” and “religion,” “modernity” and “tradition.” Secularism
was a force for good, many argued: it promoted tolerance, acceptance
of religious diversity and prescribed a set of values that a liberal demo-
cratic society could live by. But there were those who disagreed. Ashis
Nandy was an early “post-secularist.” Writing on religion and politics in
the context of the rise of Hindu nationalism, he categorically rejected
secularism as a way to combat the ills of communalism or religious intol-
erance, arguing that Indians had their own traditions of how to live
together that they should look to (Nandy 1988; 1997).
This article examines what the term secularism represented at the point
of Indian independence, when it became part of political discourse. There
is a story of what secularism signified in India with which we are familiar.
A political ideology tied to nationalism, secularism was seen to stand for
India’s modernity and the peaceful integration of its diverse religious com-
munities. It defined the nature of citizenship in the postcolonial state.
Secularism was to be the antidote to religious sectarianism that nationalists
such as Jawaharlal Nehru and Sardar Patel believed were the root cause of
Partition. In India, the term for the political mobilization of a religious
identity is “communalism.” Religion would take its place in the private
lives of individuals, as it did in any modern society, and secularism
would overcome the forces of communalism.2
It is widely acknowledged that in public debate, secularism in India
remains a simple formulaic assertion against any demonstration of religion
however that may be defined or understood (Bhargava 2010). Less reli-
gion equals more tolerance. Fewer reservations for minorities mean
greater national integration and democracy. This binary opposition has
obscured rather than illuminated an understanding of contemporary
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problems related to minorities, democracy and identity. It has, for instance,
been unable to examine the representation of the cultural rights of Indian
Muslims other than letting them be decided by a panel of conservative
judges as in the case of Shah Bano in 1985. Neither has it been able to
address the violent attacks against Christian communities and their forci-
ble “reconversion” to Hinduism by Hindu nationalists in Gujarat, Madhya
Pradesh, and Orissa from 1998, nor account for the pervasive anti-Muslim
and anti-low caste sentiment among India’s middle classes in relation to
policies for reservations in education and employment, other than by
asserting that these are forces of tradition and narrow-mindedness which
have no place in a modern society.3
I argue here that a study of the range of issues from which secularism
emerged historically offers a different avenue to understand its meaning in
India. These issues had, from the early 20th century, to do with ensuring
the public representation of minorities, both religious and caste, regardless
of their relative size or social power. Representation was measured through
reservations in public institutions such as the army and civil service as
well as in schools and universities. Places for minorities were also reserved
in regional legislatures as well as central political bodies, often through
separate electorates, which were to ensure that in matters of politics and
policy, a plurality of interests and voices may be heard. Secularism was
not used to describe these measures. On the contrary, there was a great
deal of opposition to them particularly from self-styled nationalists of
the Indian National Congress, arguably the “liberal” or “mainstream”
anti-colonial platform, and the Hindu Mahasabha, a right-leaning organiz-
ation that forwarded a majority Hindu, anti-Muslim agenda, on the
grounds that they fuelled “communal” and “anti-national” sentiment
among such communities.
It is significant that the term “secularism” was not widely used in Indian
political discourse until the transition to independence. Historically, the
colonial state had not remained separate from religious communities: it
intervened in disputes, legislated on custom and managed, and taxed reli-
gious institutions that were under its jurisdiction. Its rhetoric was not a
separation of religious and political institutions but of “non-interference”
in the customs and traditions of Indians. It sought to stand as a neutral
adjudicator, to uphold rather than alter traditions. However, as many
have argued, the state legislated on, and altered customs in many contexts
in a myriad of different ways (Bhattacharya 1996; Carroll, 1983,
Appadurai 1981). Nevertheless, for our purposes, the important point is
this: if one takes secularism to mean the separation of the state from
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religious institutions, neither was the term used, nor was it practiced in
colonial India. There was no history of secularism in India before indepen-
dence. India’s postcolonial state continued the practice of its predecessor,
seeking a position of “equidistance” from religious institutions rather than
separation from them (Luthera 1964; Smith 1963). Or as Rajeev Bhargava
has recently argued, it sought to maintain a position of “principled dis-
tance” (Bhargava 2010).
This article outlines the debates on the minority or communal questions
from the early 20th century up to independence. It argues that secularism
in India emerged as a category in relation to these debates; indeed, that
secularism was defined against these earlier attempts to balance the
rights and entitlements of communities as such. There were important
continuities with the colonial period: secularism after independence
signified all that nationalism had before — a unifying ideal opposed to
the politics of “communalism.” “Communalism,” by 1930, had become
associated with the assertions of religious minorities, particularly
Muslims, for political and, in some cases, territorial recognition: guaran-
teed representation in legislatures and the grouping of provinces with
Muslim majorities in the north-west of the subcontinent.
There were also significant departures from the past. Until the constitu-
ent assembly (1946–1950), the claims of minorities, both religious and
caste, had been considered together. By the time the constitution was rati-
fied in 1950, these claims had been separated. Reservations for religious
minorities were abandoned altogether on the basis that their interests
would be protected in India’s secular state; those for the Untouchables
and “tribal” communities, now known as the Scheduled Castes and
Scheduled Tribes, were retained for a limited period until these commu-
nities were deemed to have reached a level where they no longer required
support (Bajpai 2010, chs. 2 and 4; Jha 2002; Tejani 2008, ch. 6).4 The
representation of a plurality of voices and communities was no longer
enough to justify the continued existence of reservations.
The Constituent Assembly Debates (1946–1950) have been the subject
of scholarly scrutiny in relation to secularism and the representation of
minorities (Ansari 1999; Bajpai 2010; Chiriyankandath 2000; Copland
2010; Jha 2002). On minority representation, some have argued that the
elimination of reservations for religious minorities represented an attenu-
ation of their rights (Ansari 1999; Bajpai 2010). In the discussions on
secularism, this scholarship has retained its focus on religion. To elaborate
the meanings of secularism in the Indian context, scholars have tended to
take a normative view of what constitutes its practice, namely, the
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separation of political from religious institutions and the protection of reli-
gious minorities. Secularism’s meaning, in public debate and in scholar-
ship, remains fundamentally about religion (Copland 2010; Jha 2002;
Chiriyankandath 2000). For instance, Shefali Jha’s examination of secular-
ism traces the way the debate unfolded in the constituent assembly. She
examines its main themes: safeguards for religious minorities, religious
education in government schools, and the uniform civil code. But in so
doing, her analysis remains within the bounds of the debates itself and
reproduces a meaning for secularism in India as necessarily tied to reli-
gion. Bajpai, in contrast, argues that secularism was one of a series of
overlapping concepts — democracy, social justice, development, and
national unity — which laid the conceptual framework for how the min-
ority question would be resolved (Bajpai 2010, chs. 3 and 4).
I depart from this literature when it comes to the particular way in which
secularism was defined in this context. If we are to develop an understand-
ing of secularism at the point it entered public political debate in India, we
have to shift our perspective away from religion and make caste central to
our analysis.5 Like Bajpai, I have argued that secularism was a relational
category that emerged at the nexus of nationalism and democracy (Tejani
2008, 14–15). But central to the formulation of India’s democracy were
the Scheduled Castes. India’s secularism was defined around the fate of
the Scheduled Castes. Where Bajpai has argued that the separation of reli-
gious and caste reservations led to the narrowing of the rights of religious
minorities, I would take this further to say that it was through this very
separation that Indian secularism was defined.
This article unfolds in three parts. The first outlines the main debates on
secularism in India. The second examines the shifting philosophical
underpinnings of holding minor communities apart by their recognition
through reservations from the first instance of their introduction in 1909
through the Communal Award in 1932 to the final ratification of the con-
stitution in 1950. The final section turns to a consideration of recent
debates on secularism more broadly with a view to seeing how far the his-
torical experience of India allows us to reflect on and redefine the category
of secularism for these times.
DEBATE ON SECULARISM IN INDIA
There are four distinct strands to the debate on secularism in India. First,
the liberal left position that religion and politics belong in different
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spheres. This position saw the rise of Hindutva in the 1980s as represent-
ing a crisis of the secular state. Religion had not taken its place in the
private sphere, and it was the attachment of Indians to their primordial
identities that had prevented the emergence of a civic ideal. For the propo-
nents of this position, secularism represented the “operation of scientific
temper and rationality” (Verma 1990). Not all defenders of secularism
embraced the modernization model. Some argued that it was not solely
a western concept, but in fact has a long history in India (Puri 1990).
In India, the argument goes, secularism was not understood in terms of
the separation of religion and politics but as “tolerance.” This is a civiliza-
tional argument which maintains that Indian “culture” has, since ancient
times, accommodated many different peoples. Hindu dharma, with its
loose structure, was able to draw into its ambit the mores of these
different people because it held within it an indigenous concept of secu-
larism, sarva dharma samabhava, the idea that all religions are true.6
Gandhi, most famously, argued that tolerance and the accommodation
of difference was an inherent characteristic of Indian culture (Parekh
1989, ch. 4).
Second is the argument that secularism has no place in India. This is
represented by those such as T.N. Madan and Ashis Nandy. Madan, in
his much-cited piece “Secularism in its Place,” argued that privatization
of religion was a product of late Christianity but the Indian religions of
Islam, Hinduism, Buddhism, and Sikhism have no history of a
Reformation and thus no prescription for the separation of secular and
sacred spheres (Madan 1987 [1998]). Secularism was thus a “borrowed
idea” in India, at odds in a society whose very fabric was religious.
Yet, in the face of what he calls the “recrudescence of religious fanati-
cism,” intellectuals continued to see secularism as “the sole and adequate
remedy” against communalism. They underestimated the fact that “reli-
gion itself could be a powerful resource in the struggle against religious
extremism” (Madan 1998, 308). Madan suggested that those who under-
stood religion as mere superstition should take home-grown traditions
seriously. Ashis Nandy is a similarly ardent critic (Nandy 1988 [1998]).
South Asian cultures live with “fluid definitions of the self,” which are
fundamentally incompatible with secularism’s ideologies of progress
and modernization, he maintains. The attempt to create public and
private identities — to persuade Indians to see themselves as Indians
first and Muslims, or Sikhs second — has little meaning in India.
Madan and Nandy argue that Indian culture has its own methods of
dealing with religious intolerance that people can draw on. Rejecting
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the legitimacy of secularism altogether, Nandy argues that in India, secu-
larism can never be anything more than an “imperialism of categories”
(Nandy 1998, 321).
Madan and Nandy are both astute critics of liberal secularism. Each sees
it as an imposition of a world view incompatible with the epistemologies
of India. However, in depicting Indian society as “traditional,” as against
the creeping and pernicious modernization of the West, each essentializes
an idea of “tradition.” And, in their search for indigenous answers to the
problems of sectarianism, they see Indian modes of tolerance as stemming
from what can broadly be called Hindu civilization. In this sense, as Sumit
Sarkar has argued, this position shares discursive ground with the Hindu
right (Sarkar 1994).
The third strand is the position represented by the Hindu right. This
holds that any recognition of minorities, specifically Muslims, is
“pseudo-secularism” (Talreja 1996). This was the charge Hindu national-
ists brought against the Congress. They argued that this so-called secular
party was bringing religion into politics. Reservations for minorities in
public institutions and the continued support of a separate civil law for
Muslims were examples brought as evidence of such pseudo-secularism.
This position maintains that a genuinely secular state would not recognize
any difference among its citizens, that it would treat each as equal before
the law. However, its reactionary nature comes from its determined claims
that the majority population, and therefore the norm of civic culture, is
Hindu. This shares with the first position the idea that over thousands of
years, migrants, traders, and warriors came to India and became Indian.
Where it diverges is that the accommodative nature of Hindu dharma is
seen as a weakness rather than strength. The characteristic “tolerance”
of Indian civilization is represented as a tragic naïve innocence that
resulted in Indians falling before the proselytizing religions of Islam and
Christianity. At the same time, the qualities of this dharmic universalism
left nobody untouched. Converts to other religions remained in essence
Hindu, since it was from the same racial and cultural stock that all had
emerged.
The fourth position is represented by Rajeev Bhargava. Secularism in
India has been understood as a “doctrine with a fixed content,” its rich
and varied history has been reduced “to a dead and monotonously
repeated formula” which “mechanically separates religion from the state
… foolishly innocent of its ties with substantive values,” he argues
(Bhargava 2007, 22–24). Bhargava’s point is that in India, secularism
had certain underlying meanings which developed historically but
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which have been forgotten and need to be recovered. In looking to this
history, Bhargava turns to the constitution which provides for state inter-
vention in religious affairs. Article 25(2)(b), for instance, allows the state
to intervene in the activities of Hindu religious institutions on the grounds
of social welfare and reform: it can require temples to be opened “to all
classes and sections of Hindus” (Bhargava 2007, 35). Article 17 abolished
Untouchability, a central feature of the caste system and Hinduism. While
these provisions do not reflect a strict institutional separation from reli-
gion, Bhargava maintains they were progressive measures which sought
to enhance the democratic nature of the state without undermining secular-
ism (Bhargava 2007, 41). Indeed, he goes on, Western theories have
treated secularism as a “single-value doctrine”: separation “for the sake
of the fullest possible liberties of individuals including their religious
liberty.” In India, it was a “multi-value doctrine.” It sought to promote
the liberal ideal of tolerance, but further values became associated with
it because of the way in which secularism was tied closely with democratic
and nationalist ideals, particularly “citizenship rights, including the rights
of religious minorities” (Bhargava 2007, 47). What made Indian secular-
ism distinctive in Bhargava’s view, was the state’s position of “principled
distance” — it interfered as necessary to uphold the rights of commu-
nities — an approach that had its own history in India.
Madan and Nandy’s wholesale rejection of secularism comes out of
what they see as its failure to provide a basis for communal harmony
and integration in India. The position of the Hindu right seeks to
enforce a strict secularism where no recognition of group rights exists at
all. Bhargava, in the face of the “crisis” in Indian secularism, wants to
recover a distinctive meaning for it, there is too much at stake politically
to abandon secularism, he says. Each of these positions critiques the nor-
mative model and each re-inscribes a separate meaning for the term. The
“many meanings” of secularism amply demonstrates that a stable, univer-
sal meaning for the idea can no longer be taken for granted. Yet it also
allows wildly contradictory political positions to exist on a level with
each other and can dissolve into an uncritical relativism. As an “empty”
category devoid of inherent meaning, it has been open to appropriation
in sometimes cynical ways.
Partha Chatterjee, Neera Chandhoke, and Aditya Nigam have all
acknowledged this ambivalence and outline the problems that the secular-
ism-religion binary had led to (Chandhoke 1999; Chatterjee 1994; Nigam
2006). However, rather than evolving new meanings, each examines what
secularism has meant in the different circumstances of its contestation. In
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their own ways, they argue that secularism in India has less to do with
defining the contours whereby the state may or may not intervene in reli-
gious affairs, or the degree of religiosity of the population itself. Instead, it
is related to what the recognition of difference — of minority commu-
nities — means for the formulation of a national community within the
framework of liberalism. Chandhoke, for instance, contends that secular-
ism in India represented a democratic ethos, but one that expressed
itself in the language of religion. Thus, it was not about finding the
right place for religion per se, but ensuring the rights of minorities. This
resonates with Bhargava’s and Bajpai’s positions outlined earlier, and,
in its emphasis on secularism as part of Indian liberalism, with my own.
But Bhargava, Bajpai, Chandhoke, and others begin at the point of inde-
pendence. I want to take a longer historical perspective that begins in the
early twentieth century and draws in the problem of caste.
HISTORIES OF REPRESENTATION
Separate Electorates, 1909
In 1906, the government of India began considering constitutional reform.
A deputation of prominent Muslims had visited the Viceroy, Lord Minto,
in October of the same year, to argue that in any such reform, Muslims
should, on account of their status as a minority in India and their historical
significance to Indian society, be considered an electoral category in their
own right. Colonial officials agreed. Their agenda for introducing reforms
at this moment was two-fold: first, to provide a counter to what they saw as
the “growth of a sentiment of nationality” as witnessed in the political agi-
tation against the partition of Bengal in 1905, initiated largely by Western
educated Brahmins. Morley, the Secretary of State for India, believed that
alongside this growing “nationality” existed “a great body of conservative
opinion,” men who were loyal to government. These were the landlords,
the “great agricultural classes,” who would provide stability in the
winds of change, and it was they who should be made central to any pol-
itical reform.7 Second, the reforms were a gesture toward Indian liberals
who had pushed for greater representation on executive and legislative
bodies.
Officials insisted, however, that the reforms had to be “appropriate”:
they had to reflect “the actual distribution of power in society” rather
than seek to change it, noted Theodore Morison, an advisor on council
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reform.8 Earlier reforms in 1892 had resulted in members of the urban pro-
fessional classes, representing a tiny sliver of society, coming to the fore.
Rural interests, such as those of the big landlords, as well as Muslims, had
gone almost completely without representation. While the professional
classes were certainly best able to compete, they had been disproportio-
nately successful and the results did not reflect the character of Indian
society. Minto maintained it was their responsibility to structure a
system that would fairly represent and draw into formal politics a wider
array of social groups than currently existed. The 1892 reforms were
thought to have failed because they had been based on territorial rather
than communal representation. They were Minto felt, “a western importa-
tion uncongenial to Eastern tastes.”9
European orientalists and colonial officials had long understood
Indian society as comprised of communities — of sect, caste, and reli-
gion — rather than individuals. These were the “natural compartments”
of society and could provide the foundation for a system where the prin-
ciple of territorial voting had not. These compartments extended to other
non-confessional interests: landholding, commercial, educational as well
as religious. The reforms would be an attempt to balance these interests.
There were contradictions inherent in this approach. Minto noted that by
bringing communal groups to the forefront, the reforms marked
“a complete departure from our attitude of neutrality as between races
and sects.” But he justified this on the grounds that the rigidity of
India’s communities meant that they “can be represented in the fullest
sense of the word only by persons who actually belong to them.”10
Significantly, the idea of balancing interests implied a certain parity
among them. So, while Hindus were a numerical majority across India,
reforms were bound to represent communities’ interests in roughly
equal ways.
Communal bodies to be represented in the imperial legislative councils
for non-official members included the professional middle class, land-
holders, Muslims, European commerce, and Indian commerce. A small
number were also reserved for “minorities, special interest, or experts.”
Provincial councils in the Bombay, Bengal, and Madras presidencies
and the United Provinces would have seats reserved in such a way as to
reflect the communal interests in each region. In the Bombay
Presidency, for instance, they were: municipalities and district boards,
the presidency corporation, the university, landholders, Muslims, the
Bombay and Karachi Chambers of Commerce, mill owners associations
for Bombay and Karachi and the Indian commercial community.11
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These communal bodies would have a separate electorate, that is, a repre-
sentative taken from within the group who was elected or nominated only
by members of the group itself. Fearing that this would isolate commu-
nities from participating in, and eventually merging with, the wider
“general” electorate, Minto proposed these communities would have a
“double vote” — they would cast their vote in a joint as well as a separate
electorate.
Communities that had been given separate recognition in councils wel-
comed the measures, although some argued they did not go far enough.
However, the urban professional class, the majority of whom were
upper-caste and Western educated, were vehemently opposed, arguing
that the reforms were “medieval,” “denationalizing” and evidence of an
imperial conspiracy of divide and rule. The government had abandoned
its policy of non-interference, many argued, and was now showing
blatant partisan behavior. The Bombay Presidency Association contended
that these reforms should reward merit, they should “enable the
Government to secure the benefit of the knowledge, experience, advice
and cooperation of the most capable and the best trusted representation
of all classes and interests.”12 It was widely held that if Muslims had
not taken advantage of the opportunities afforded to them by colonial
rule, they had “only themselves to blame for the consequences of their
neglect.”13 The separate electorate for Muslims, rather than landholder
and commercial groups, caused the greatest alarm as it was seen to intro-
duce religion into politics: “the State should not penalize political opinions
and favour religious beliefs. British rule in India will be deprived of one of
its most potent justifications if it ceased to exercise a unifying influence on
the heterogeneous people of the country. The ideals it is bound to keep
before it are modern, not medieval.”14
Despite continued opposition, separate electorates with supplementary
participation in joint electorates were introduced for communal bodies.
Officials of the government tried to appease concerns saying that the
measures were temporary. Significantly, the reforms created Muslims as
a separate political category. Equally important was the justification for
this measure: the separate electorate became seen as the way to educate
socially and politically “backward” communities in the ways of liberal
democracy, to protect their identities and personalities as they were inte-
grated into a larger representative framework and to ensure that they
reflected the plural communal landscape of India. The separate electorate
would shape all future attempts to address the place of the minority com-
munity in the nation.15
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Ambedkar and a Proposal for Separate Electorates for
Untouchables, 1919
After the First World War, came the second round of constitutional
reforms in which B.R. Ambedkar made the argument for separate electo-
rates for Untouchables.16 Ambedkar, deeply critical of Congress’ and
Gandhi’s approach to Untouchable reform, would become the foremost
advocate of Untouchable rights. He argued strongly that social reform
as advocated by upper-caste reformers, including Gandhi, would never
be adequate to lift the depressed classes out of their historically margina-
lized state to join society as equal citizens.17 Rather, in line with argu-
ments forwarded for separate communal electorates in 1909, Ambedkar
maintained that Untouchables should be considered a minority in their
own right and enjoy the protection that came with such recognition.
India, he said, was a society fundamentally divided by communities iso-
lated from one another. Unlike other societies which overcame divisions
through fluid interaction between different groups, India was divided by
religion and, most profoundly, by caste where the greatest divide lay
between “touchables” and Untouchables (Ambedkar 1989, 247–249).
He warned that it would do no good to ignore these if representative poli-
tics had any hope of being democratic and popular. Territorial constituen-
cies would be inappropriate as they had so proved for other communal
bodies, for they were properly representative only of material interests.
The injustice that would be committed by instituting territorial elections
would be that while “it may not leave unrepresented the interests of the
members of the minor groups, [it] leaves them without any chance of per-
sonal representation” (Ambedkar 1989, 251).
Territorial constituencies, unable to guarantee a voice for the interests of
minor communities, failed to create a genuinely representative govern-
ment. Instead, Ambedkar favored proportional representation for
Untouchables in the different regions and separate communal electorates
as a way to achieve this. He remarked that liberal democracies made no
provision for communal representation on the grounds that they were
seen to forward particular social agendas over the unity of the nation.
However, the premise of this position was that the social and the political
could be easily separated, that Untouchability was an issue for reformers
and constitutionalism a political concern. But the social and the political
were inseparable and could not be “worn one at a time as the season
demands.” Open competition “is as it should be if all were equally free
to fight,” but “to educate untouchables by Shahtras [sic] into pro-
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touchables and the untouchables into anti-untouchables and then to
propose that the two should fight out at an open poll is to betray signs
of mental aberration or a mentality fed on cunning” (Ambedkar 1989,
263).18 Indeed, it was this approach that would tend to “develop the per-
sonality of the few at the cost of the many” (Ambedkar 1989, 251).
Ambedkar recommended in 1919 that Untouchables be allowed to elect
their own representatives but it was not to be. The Southborough
Committee decided against on the basis that they were not educated
enough to provide an electorate. Instead, representatives would be nomi-
nated to the provinces.
A Minorities Pact, London, 1932
Ambedkar took these arguments forward to the Round Table Conferences
in London in 1931. These meetings were called to formulate a constitution
for a future independent India. Previous attempts in 1928 had foundered
around the issue of communal representation (All Parties Conference,
1928). Ambedkar took his place alongside a range of other representatives
of minority communities: Indian Christians, Sikhs, Muslims, and
European commercial bodies, all of whom maintained that the constitution
should recognize minority communities through reservations and so legit-
imize their place in the nation.
Gandhi, as the representative of the Congress, articulated the opposition
that the Congress, Hindu Mahasabha, and Indian Liberals among others
shared: the communal or minority question had nothing to do with nation-
alism but was a problem for nationalism to overcome. Moreover, consti-
tution-making did not have to wait for the communal question to be
resolved: “solution or settlement of [the] communal problem should not
be a condition precedent [on] or a bar to the settlement of purely consti-
tutional issues. If we fail utterly to come to [a] communal settlement still
constitution-making must go on and should not be impeded in any way by
anybody.”19 Gandhi was ever optimistic about what independence would
bring: “I have not a shadow of a doubt that the iceberg of communal
differences will melt under the warmth of the sun of freedom.” Soon
enough, Congress would be recognized as the wholly representative
body that it was. It would, along with upper-castes, work to bring down
the terrible institution of Untouchability but through social amelioration
rather than political intervention: “[the Depressed Classes] need protection
from social and religious persecution [rather] than election to
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legislatures.”20 Representatives of minority communities disagreed. For
them the constitutional and communal questions were inextricably
linked and it was their very citizenship in India that was at stake. The
Minorities Pact presented their demands: separate electorates for all.
The Round Table Conferences broke down around this. When the Labour
Prime Minister Ramsay Macdonald returned in 1932 with his solution in
the form of the Communal Award which granted separate electorates to all
the minorities in question, there was a huge outcry. The main opposition
settled around Untouchables. Gandhi went on his famous “fast unto death”
in protest of what he called a “vivisection” of Hinduism, and others argued
that if Untouchables were seen as a separate community, India would be
rendered a nation of minorities. A liberal democracy required a national
majority, which until now had been the broadly-defined community
of Hindus. Enough pressure was placed on Ambedkar that he retracted
his position. It was agreed that there would be reservations for
Untouchables in legislatures but no separate electorate: Ambedkar was
roundly defeated (Kumar 1985). The question of what provisions would
be made for communal minorities was again on hold until it had finally
to be resolved at the constituent assembly.
Religion, Caste and Citizenship at the Constituent Assembly,
1946–1950
The purpose of reservations for minorities in late colonial India was seen
to have been two-fold. First, to achieve a fair and accurate representation
of voices of “major” and “minor” communities in a society that was
understood to be constituted by its communities. Second, they were
seen to have an educative role: to draw communities considered socially
and educationally “backward” — whose participation in institutions of
political representation had hitherto been marginal — into the fray.
Reservations were seen as a way of overcoming such “backwardness”
and thus widening the nascent democratic process. The provisions that
emerged from the constituent assembly for minority provision represented
a significant break with this longer history.
India’s constitution enshrined the values of liberalism. The Objectives
Resolution adopted in January 1947 envisioned a constitution that:
guaranteed and secured to all people equality of status, of opportunity, and
before the law, freedom of thought, expression, belief, faith, worship, voca-
tion, association and action, subject to law and public morality; and wherein
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adequate safeguards shall be provided for minorities, backward and tribal
areas, and depressed and other backward classes (Shiva Rao 1967, 61).21
The rights relating to religion had to do with the guarantee of the freedom
of conscience, religious worship and the freedom to profess religion
subject to public order, and morality. That minorities — linguistic, cul-
tural, religious, and political — should be protected was never at issue.
The most pressing question in terms of the promise of safeguards for min-
orities and backward classes was who precisely constituted these popu-
lations, and what the nature of this protection should be. An Advisory
Committee on minorities was set up to deal with these questions.
The assembly agreed very early on to abolish separate electorates: they
were seen to have heightened rather than diminished communal differ-
ences and were an obstacle to national unity. Pandit Govind Ballabh
Pant, a member of the Congress Working Committee, argued that
Indians had now to think in terms of individual citizenship rather than
their affiliation to a community (CAD, vol. II, 310–312). It would be
“suicidal” for minorities themselves if separate electorates were upheld,
he said (CAD, vol. V, 222–224). Instead, reservation quotas in joint elec-
torates were to be introduced in legislatures as well as a range of public
institutions. Significantly, the criteria had yet to be determined for what
constituted minority status. What was recognition as a minority meant
to achieve?
An advocate for adivasis (indigenous, “tribal” communities) from Bihar
argued that to be categorized as a “minority” diminished their signifi-
cance. Adivasis were “the original owners of this country” and could
“never be considered a minority” (CAD, vol. V, 209). However, for
Scheduled Castes, recognition as a minority was crucial. One Scheduled
Caste Congress representative from Madras argued that separate minority
status was important if they were to resist attempts to appropriate them into
the Hindu or Muslim community (CAD, vol. V, 206–207).
There remained considerable opposition to reservations even in joint
electorates. But whatever disputes existed around the nature or proportion
of recognition, that Muslims, Sikhs, Christians, and Anglo-Indians were
minorities was not in question. It was on the Scheduled Castes that the dis-
cussion turned. That they should be considered a minority made many
uneasy: they were, by rights, Hindus. K.M. Munshi, for instance,
argued that to extend the term “minority” to include the Scheduled
Castes was “a very mischievous extension.” They were “part and parcel
of [the] Hindu community, and the safeguards are given to them to
718 Tejani
terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1755048313000606
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. SOAS - University of London, on 21 Jun 2019 at 09:59:32, subject to the Cambridge Core
protect their rights only till [sic] they are completely absorbed into the
Hindu community” (CAD, vol. V, 227). Others argued that if Scheduled
Castes were made a category in their own right, then together with
Muslims, they would comprise almost half the population, after which
there would be reservations for Christians, Sikhs, Buddhists, and others,
leaving Hindus a minority without any influence. This was not democracy
as it was commonly understood (CAD, vol. VI, August 28, 1947, 255).
Many argued that the only defense for reservations was that they would
uplift the backward classes. For Nehru, reservations were part of the
“duty and responsibility of the majority” (CAD, vol. VII, November 8,
1948, 323). That the issue of minority representation turned on the
Scheduled Castes rather than Muslims is perhaps surprising. But the way
these disenfranchised castes were to be classified — as communities in
their own right, or a socio-economic grouping temporarily in need of
support to integrate them as citizens in India’s new democracy — would
provide the justification for how the policy on reservations would unfold.
Secularism
The discussion on secularism in the assembly rested on the importance of
delineating domestic and civic spheres. In many ways, it reflected a nor-
mative meaning for secularism. The practice of religion, it was agreed,
would be a private concern and thus outside the jurisdiction of the state.
Moreover, religious institutions would not receive state patronage.
However, the state retained the right to regulate the “secular” activities
of religious institutions. Thus, the question of whether a secular state
should be able to tax religious buildings, if it had the jurisdiction to
order that a temple serving high caste communities should be open to
all, whether Muslims in a sabil (a public drinking fountain) could be
allowed to restrict water to non-Muslims and if state-funded schools
should include religious instruction in their curricula, all featured in the
consideration of the nature and structure of the Indian secular state.22
The protection of the fundamental rights of minorities was closely
woven into this discussion. There were those who argued that protection
for a group violated the principles of a secular state (CAD, vol. VII,
November 9, 1948, 362). Others, Muslim, and Sikh representatives in par-
ticular, maintained that their protection had to be explicitly written into the
constitution. Moreover, Muslims argued that personal law must be recog-
nized: “in a secular State, citizens belonging to different communities
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must have the freedom to practice their own religion, observe their own
life, and their personal laws should be applied to them” (CAD, vol. VII,
544). However, others opposed personal law precisely on the grounds
that religious practice was a private affair. “Religion,” K.M. Munshi
stated in his defense of a uniform civil code, “must be restricted to
spheres which legitimately appertain to religion, and the rest of life
must be regulated … in such a manner that we may evolve … a strong
and consolidated nation” (CAD, vol. VII, 547–548).
In April 1947, the advisory committee on minorities recommended that
there should be reservations in joint electorates for minorities for 10 years.
However, independence had a significant bearing on this agreement and
the debate on secularism. From 1920, the constitutional discussions
around protection of communal and minority interests comprised both
caste and religion. Independence and partition seemed to answer the com-
munal problem — partition created the state of Pakistan, the ostensible
home for India’s Muslims, and independence created a democratic
secular republic for India where minorities would be protected. Thus,
after 1947, the purpose of reservations changed. If the secular state
ensured freedom of religion and the protection of religious minorities,
reservations would bring a measure of equality of opportunity for the dis-
enfranchised classes, the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes.23
In 1948, a sub-committee revised the provisions for reservations determin-
ing that they would exist now only for “any backward classes who in the
opinion of the State are not adequately represented in the public services”
(Shiva Rao 1967, 296). Muslim, Sikh, and Christian representatives in the
assembly all made the argument that their communities should be classified
as “backward” on the basis that they were also underrepresented in the ser-
vices and politically marginalized. But in 1949 the sub-committee decided
that “it was no longer appropriate in the context of free India and of
present conditions that there should be reservations of seats for Muslims,
Christians, Sikhs or any other religious minority” (CAD, vol. VIII,
AppendixA,May11, 1949, 311). Instead, itwas agreed that “the peculiar pos-
ition of the Scheduled Castes would make it necessary to give them reser-
vations for a period of 10 years as originally decided” (CAD, vol. VIII,
311). Thus, reservations for religious minorities were withdrawn.
Jha sees this as a failure of the representative system. Why, she asks,
could “secular democracy” be used to deny representative safeguards to
religious minorities while protecting cultural, linguistic and, I would
add, caste, minorities (Jha 2003, 1580)? Bajpai argues that a “legitimating
vocabulary” of liberalism was well-established by this period and
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precluded reservations on the basis of religion (Bajpai 2010, 167).
A liberal democracy, by definition, could only accommodate difference
for the socio-economically “backward.” Thus, arguments made by
Muslims in the constituent assembly asserting that they too were “back-
ward” were dismissed (Shiva Rao 1967, vol. II, 693; Tejani 2008, 255).
The power that a recognition of “backwardness” had, then, was to
enable the continuation of constitutional recognition of one set of minori-
ties and not another.
Bajpai has argued that the “nationalist resolution of the minority ques-
tion” came with this separation of “backward class” from “religious min-
ority” for reservations and safeguards. She maintains that this was an
outcome of the particular moment (Bajpai 2010, ch. 4). However, histori-
cally, the premise of reservations for minorities was that they would allow
communities to overcome their condition of “backwardness.” In 1909, if
we recall, the separate electorate for Muslims was deemed a temporary
measure precisely for this reason. Indian secularism identified religious
minorities to protect. However, by not allowing the recognition of “back-
wardness,” secularism essentialized the “religious community,” thus
removing the dynamic possibilities that such recognition might have
brought. It was this reified category of religion that forged a meaning
for secularism in postcolonial India.
CONCLUSIONS: REDEFINING SECULARISM IN A POST-
SECULAR AGE
Secularism is a term that stands in for an approach to a world uninformed
by, although not necessarily extinguished of, religious faith, one that
embraces a worldly ethics and rational thought rather than belief in a
divine law of reward and punishment. Necessarily embedded in its
meaning is a relationship to “religion.” “Religion,” often stands in for “tra-
dition,” reflecting a personal attachment to ascriptive social identities as
well as to belief in a social order founded on hierarchy and informed by
faith in the supernatural. Yet, as scholars have long argued, religion is a
category that emerged in early modern Europe at the very point at
which it became possible to conceive of a world moved by nature rather
than a divine power. It is at this point that religion could be seen as one
set of human practices among many (Asad 2003, Introduction; Calhoun
et al. 2011, 6). The term given to this process of social differentiation
of spheres is secularization. However, rather than a natural and progressive
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distancing of the modern secular world from its traditional, divinely-
informed precursor, scholars such as Talal Asad have pointed out that
“religion” is a particularly modern category defined through and by the
“secular”: the two were inextricably interlinked and mutually self-defin-
ing. To argue that the categories of religion and secularism were
defined in a particular historical context explicitly denies the universality
of the secularization thesis.24 Asad maintains that their historical speci-
ficity meant that these categories, as part of a project of modernity, had
“specific practical tasks” within a given society (Asad 2003, 183).
Such an insight shifts the possibilities for studies of secularism from
sociological process to historical genealogy. The secularism-religion
binary that has framed debates on studies of religion in the public
sphere across the globe has circumscribed the terrain within the bounds
of its own categories. As Jose Casanova has argued, the fundamental
problem with normative secularism is that it “entails a theory of what ‘reli-
gion’ is or does.” It assumes that “religion” can exist in the abstract, as
“a thing that has an essence or that produces certain particular and predict-
able effects” (Casanova 2011, 66). Thus, religion is “intolerant” and
“causes conflict,” where secularism overcomes such conflict through “tol-
erance” (Calhoun 2011, 69). Genealogies allow us to pry apart this “clash
of civilizations” approach to understanding religious violence. Historical
case studies can elaborate how and why these categories developed and
what they meant in relation to political ideologies and social customs: it
can elaborate, in Asad’s terms, their “tasks” in particular contexts. This
can allow us to explore why religion still seems to matter in a secular age.
Taylor has pointed out that we need a radical redefinition of secularism
(Taylor 2011a). He argues that scholars dealing with issues of religion
and society “have the wrong model” of secularism: “We think that secular-
ism (laicité) has to do with the relationship of the state and religion; whereas
in fact it has to dowith the (correct) response of the democratic state to diver-
sity” (Taylor 2011a, 36). It is the fixation on religion, Taylor argues, which
obfuscates a proper study of secularism in different contexts. The reason that
religion has taken center-stage in discussions on secularism has to do with
the focus on institutional arrangements — the separation of Church and
State or the privatization of religion. But, he maintains, these arrangements
were themselves particular responses to historical situations. They were
devised to manage grassroots protests and sectarian crises against the
entrenched power of various Churches in early modern Europe.
Taylor’s study of secularism centers on Latin Christendom in the North
Atlantic world from 1500. He argues that a range of scientific,
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philosophical, religious, and political developments from this period
created a world where it became possible not to believe in God. Indeed,
“faith, even for the staunchest believer” was simply “one human possi-
bility among others” (Taylor 2007, 3). People in the West now live and
make sense of their world in what he calls an “immanent frame,” the tan-
gible, knowable world around them. Taylor argues powerfully that the
history of secularism in the different societies of Western Europe varied
according to what the particular negotiations between the different
Churches and states were meant to achieve in each context. For instance,
in England, secularism emerged as a counter to religious sectarianism, to
create “tolerance” and protect a variety of religious beliefs and practices
(Mendus 1988). Thus, “secularism” had a different history in the United
States than it did in France, England, or Scandinavia and meant something
different in each place (Taylor 2011b).
However, Taylor maintains that as an understanding of the specificity of
historical experience receded, a focus on form rather than value has won
out. The separation of religion and politics is a mantra of secularism’s pro-
ponents. In contemporary liberal societies, the goals have been defined
around the “master formula” of the institutional separation of religious
and political spheres whereas it should be the other way around: “one
should start from the goals and derive the concrete arrangements from
these” (Taylor 2011a, 41). The institutional formula represents one set
of solutions to one set of problems of religion in the public sphere:
there could be other solutions to other problems. Rather than a bulwark
against religion, secular states should be “good faith” attempts to
achieve three or four basic goals in a liberal society for which a
concern with religion would have little or no necessary place: first, to
protect people’s right to belong to and practice a particular outlook;
second, equal treatment whatever that outlook may be; and third, an
equal hearing. Religious viewpoints are no more valid than non-religious
and atheistic positions in this (Taylor 2011a, 56).
Taylor is acutely attuned to the complexities of the North Atlantic
experience with religion. Yet, his argument that “secularity” is the
product of a history of reform and innovation in the European Christian
world remains circumscribed in significant ways. Saba Mahmood, for
instance, has questioned the reach of Taylor’s argument, noting that the
focus on the “North Atlantic” presumes a cultural uniformity based on
Latin Christendom (Mahmood 2011). Limiting the study to Western
Christianity does not simply limit the amount of data to analyze but has
methodological implications for the very understanding of “religion”
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and modernity. Not only does Taylor too easily overlook the world beyond
the West, he fails to account for the ways in which the internal others
(Jews, Muslims) of the North Atlantic world had a constitutive impact
on religious thought and practice itself (Mahmood 2011, 289–293).
Taylor is thus unable to ask the questions of how far and to whom the
“immanent frame” extends. Moreover, Taylor’s account precludes an
understanding of the role that religion continues to play in this secular
age. Critics of his formulation argue that by not taking on board religious
voices, a secular democratic public sphere fails in its promise of inte-
gration. The creative, ethical possibilities of this public sphere are lessened
by not being informed by religion (Calhoun et al. 2011, 18).
Theorist of the liberal public sphere, Juergen Habermas, has been
rethinking his neglect of religion (Habermas 2011; 2008). Habermas
notes that the role of religion in society has not been resolved through
secular political authority and laicism has not overcome the apparent
paradox of having religious citizens in a secular society merely by priva-
tizing religion: “as long as religious communities play a vital role in civil
society and the public sphere, deliberative politics is as much a product of
the public use of reason on the part of religious citizens as on that of non-
religious citizens” (Habermas 2011, 24). His “post-secular” position does
not call for a return to a world of religious ideas or a reversal of the secu-
larization of state power. Rather, religious traditions in a democratic
society would have a bearing on public reason: their values could be trans-
lated into a universally acceptable language of ethics for religious and
nonreligious citizens (Habermas 2011, 28). For Habermas, non-secular
world views, as well as assertions of religious communities for political
recognition, can exist within Taylor’s immanent frame, for the resolution
of religion in the public sphere must take place through this-worldly insti-
tutions and methods. Although Taylor and Habermas would part ways on
an idea of public reason and Taylor disputes post-secularism as a viable
intellectual position, they both seek just and plural solutions to the poten-
tial problem of religious diversity in liberal constitutional democracies,
rather than a normative separation of religion and politics defining the
public good.25
There are those post-secularists who argue for stepping outside the
immanent frame altogether — modern categories of religion and secular-
ism, the western individual subject and the liberal state are, themselves, the
problem. Nandy, for instance, maintains that the imposition of such cat-
egories on societies like India where they have no cultural or historical
foundation is a violent act in itself and will necessarily throw up more
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violence (Nandy 1988). This position, while possibly attractive to those
who see modern knowledge as having colonized the minds of non-
Western peoples, leads to a philosophical and intellectual cul-de-sac: if
one manages to escape modern categories, how does one know?26
This more recent scholarship allows us to reflect again on secularism in
India. Much of the debate on secularism in India has taken its meaning for
granted, relying on a reified idea of religion and defining it through its
institutional separation from politics. Those who reject it as a framework
for social organization still retain a normative understanding of “secular-
ism” and “religion” as closed categories of modernity, in binary opposi-
tion. However, this preoccupation with religion-as-thing prevents us
from understanding what it meant and who it was for in this context.
To return to Taylor: “We think of ‘secularism’ as a selfsame process
that can occur everywhere,” he writes. “And we think of secularist
regimes as an option for any country, whether or not they are actually
adopted” (Taylor 2011b, 303). But while the words may be taken up,
“do they really mean the same thing in each iteration? Are there not,
rather, subtle differences which can bedevil cross-cultural discussion on
these matters?” (Taylor 2011b, 303).
Both Taylor and Asad offer methodological approaches for understand-
ing secularism. Each has emphasized the importance of genealogy in
unearthing the specificity of historical experience which in turn elaborates
the differences in meaning across contexts. In India, such an exercise
reveals that “secularism” emerged as a category in political debate in
the transition from nationalism to independence. The dominant idea in
the constituent assembly debates was that the new state would be a
liberal democracy whose people had privatized their religious affiliations
and become citizens of the nation. Secularism in India thus shaped the
nature of citizenship. Central to this was the protection of minorities.
Self-styled representatives of religious minorities and the Scheduled
Castes and Scheduled Tribes argued that Indian democracy should recog-
nize the plurality of voices in a constitutional settlement. Bhargava would
argue that the protection of minorities was one element of the “multi-
value” system that constituted Indian secularism. Another was a state
which intervened in the practices of religious communities to uphold
values of equality. Certainly, these values of equality and plurality inter-
sect with normative secularism in ways which allow us to recover secular-
ism for India. But I would argue the point differently. Secularism in India
at the point of its clearest articulation in the constituent assembly, in the
very recognition by the state of its responsibility to protect its religious
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minorities, betrayed their dynamic potential. While liberal values of toler-
ance and protection of minorities is written into any idea of secularism, in
India, secularism was defined through the rejection of religious minorities’
claims on the state. What secularism in India denied, then, was the legiti-
macy of the place of the community in the nation. Methodologically, a
study of the context in which this political term was given life in post-
independence India, shows how secularism was defined in the particular.
NOTES
1. The phrase “a secular age” comes from Charles Taylor, whose book of the same title has
prompted scholars across disciplines to revisit the question of secularism in European history and
the contemporary world: see Taylor (2007). For commentary on this work, see Warner et al. (2010).
2. This is a position which was widely held by Indian nationalists and has been extensively repro-
duced in the post-independence period. See, Nehru (1946); Chatterji (1984); Esteves (1996); Engineer
(2003). For critical analysis, see Upadhyaya (1992); Bhargava (1998); Khilnani (2002).
3. There is an important body of literature that has grown up around these issues. On Shah Bano,
see Bajpai (2010, ch. 5); Menon (1998); Hasan (1989). On dalit Christianity and contemporary con-
version movements, see Robinson and Kujur (2010) and Sarkar (1999). On reservations in government
employment, see Bajpai (2010, ch. 6); Menon and Nigam (2007, ch. 1); Shah (2002).
4. By the time the constituent assembly sat, Untouchable and tribal communities were referred to as
the Scheduled Castes (SCs) and Scheduled Tribes (STs), respectively. A list or “schedule” of these
castes and tribes had been drawn up by region based on the 1931 Census and incorporated into the
1935 Government of India Act, the last constitutional reform before independence.
5. Dilip Menon has made a similar point about communalism: see Menon (2006).
6. Dharma is often translated as “religion” but more accurately translates as “duty” or “way.”
7. Correspondence on Council Reform, Mss Eur 573 John Morley Papers, vol. 32 (October 1906–
August 1907), Oriental and India Office Collections (OIOC), British Library, London.
8. T. Morison’s note on the “Scheme for Representation of the Principal Communities of Indian
Society,” proposed by Sir William Lee-Warner, April 18, 1907; Morley Papers, vol. 32.
9. Minto to Morley, March 21, 1907; Morley Papers, vol. 32.
10. Ibid.
11. Minto telegram October 5, 1908; Morley Papers, vol. 33 (October 1908–May 1909).
12. Bombay Presidency Association to the Government of Bombay, February 24, 1908 para. 12,
public letter from India, 1908, vol. xxxvii, quoted in Wasti (1964, 162).
13. Oriental Review, para. 22 week ending January 14, 1905, Report on Native Newspapers for the
Bombay Presidency.
14. Indian Social Reformer, November 4, 1906, week endingNovember 10,Report on Native Papers.
15. The separate electorate for non-confessional communities continued although, unlike those for
religious minorities, were not controversial and rarely appeared in the debates on minority represen-
tation later.
16. On Ambedkar see Rao (2009); Jaffrelot (2005); Omvedt (1994); Gore (1993).
17. I use “depressed classes” and “Untouchables” interchangeably here. “Depressed classes” was
the term used by the colonial government to refer to Untouchables.
18. Shastra is a general term referring to the large body of Hindu scriptures.
19. B.S. Moonje’s Diaries and Letter Pads, reel 1, Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, New
Delhi, October 7, 1931.
20. Indian Round Table Conference (second session), Proceedings, ninth sitting, October 8, 1931,
530; Moonje Diaries, October 8, 1931.
21. Taken from Pandit Govind Ballabh Pant’s speech in the Constituent Assembly moving the
Resolution. The term “backward classes” included the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, but
was a more ambiguous term and was not confined to them. This would become controversial later
in the debates.
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22. See the debate on secularism in the constituent assembly, CAD, vol. VII, November 24, 1948,
and Jha (2002).
23. Bajpai has explored in detail the process by which minorities lost their entitlement to reser-
vations: Bajpai (2010, chs. 2, 3, 4); see also Tejani (2008, ch. 6).
24. The secularization thesis has been widely reconsidered: see, Warner (2010); Bruce (2002);
Casanova (1994).
25. On Taylor’s refuting that this is a post-secular age see Craig Calhoun (2011, 78) who calls the
debate on post-secularism “a red herring.”
26. On the inherent violence of secular knowledge: see, Chakrabarty (2000).
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